""Iran's Foreign Policy in the Second Karabakh War: Factors and Approach"

This article, with a geopolitical-perspective, aims to examine the process of Iran's foreign policy approach in the Second Karabakh War and factors affecting it. By dividing the war into three periods: "Imperceptible Azerbaijan's superiority", "perceptible Azerbaijan's superiority" and "Consolidation Azerbaijan's superiority" the three trends of "negligence", "indecisiveness" and "surprise" can be explained in the process of Iran's foreign policy. According to the research claim, the macro-narrative of "Karabakh is the land of Islam" has affected the overall Iran's approach in the Karabakh crisis. The lack of internal consensus, appeasement to Russia, enmity with Israel, competition with Turkey and confrontation with the international system were among the factors affecting Iran's activism in this war. In this war, Iran neglected the Azerbaijan's power and will, and was unable to create a balance between the two narratives "Long-standing ties and the obligation of the Islamic Republic to support the Shiites" and "Separatist Context in Azeri provinces of Iran", and contented itself with declaring neutrality and verbal activism. After Baku dominated the areas bordering with Iran, with a belated understanding of the will of the Azerbaijan, took action with indecisiveness and due to the lack of clear details of the Innovative plan and the lack of consultation and extensive diplomatic activity, was surprised by clause 9 of the Moscow agreement, which became a pretext for the Zangezur Corridor project. This research was done with the analytical-historical approach and the "process tracing" method, using library resources.
Extended abstract
1- INTRODUCTION
The second Nagorno-Karabakh war, which began on September 27, 2020, in the South Caucasus, after 44 days, With the Moscow agreement established a ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. During the war, Armenian forces were forced to evacuate many lands of Azerbaijan. The Moscow agreement didn't specify the duty of the self-proclaimed Republic of Karabakh; But Yerevan was forced to leave the rest of the areas it had under control until that day. The Lachin Corridor to connect Karabakh with Armenia and a route to connect Baku with Nakhchivan were foreseen in the November 9 agreement. The clause related to the connection between Baku and Nakhchivan became a pretext for the Zangezur Corridor project, which is against Iran's national interests. This article seeks to discover the process of Iran's foreign policy approach in the Second Karabakh War and explain the internal, regional and international factors affecting it.
2- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework of the research is three-level-three-domain geopolitics. Geopolitics is the influence of geography on politics. Geopolitics is concerned with how geographic factors affect the relationship between political units. Geopolitics deals with the relationship between power, geography and world order and emphasizes the role of geographical constraints and opportunities in shaping and pursuing politics. Using the theory of "Mohiaddin Mesbahi" also helps to advance the research by providing a powerful and comprehensive framework."Mesbahi" with a triple point of view towards the international system, It provides three distinct structures of "political-military", "normative-social" and "economic".
3- METHODOLOGY
This article is done with an analytical-historical approach, relying on "process tracing". "Process tracing" is a method used to determine the causal mechanisms that link an explanatory variable to an outcome or effect. Process tracing is mainly done with the detailed description and analysis of the sequence of historical events and is based on comprehensive description and causal-process observations. This article, using the analytical-historical approach, presents a classification of the process of events and activism of Iran's foreign policy according to the statements of officials and policymakers. Also, in order to explain the factors affecting Iran's foreign policy in this war, are seeking to discover and identify the trends.
4- RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Iran's foreign policy approach in the Second Karabakh War has been affected by various factors. The macro-narrative of "Karabakh is the land of Islam" has affected the overall Iran's approach in the Karabakh crisis. As the leader of the Islamic Republic, by emphasizing the necessity of defending the land for Azerbaijanis as a religious principle, has caused Iran to support the Muslims in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The existence of two narratives "Long-standing religious, cultural and historical ties between Azeris and Iranians and the obligation of the Islamic Republic to support the Shiites" and "Separatist Context in Azeri provinces of Iran" has hindered consensus in foreign policy decision-making and persuasion of the audience. Iran sees Moscow as an ally against America; Therefore, tries not to act against Russia's interests. So that Iran's foreign policy in the Caucasus has been captured by Russia. By influencing in Baku, Israel has managed to have an ally on Iran's border. Israel is trying to promote developments in the Caucasus against national security and interests of Iran. The strategic relations between Baku and Ankara affect Iran's activism in Karabakh. The control of Azeri forces over the disputed areas, and the motivation of Turkey's land access to the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian republics through the connection of the two parts of the Republic of Azerbaijan had turned Ankara into an active actor and think tank of the Second War. At the international level, post-revolutionary Iran is presented as a threat and danger. Confrontation with the international system removes Iran from international and regional trends. By excluding Iran from international transit, Iran's interests in the geopolitical and geoeconomic fields are harmed.
By dividing the war into three periods: "Imperceptible Azerbaijan's superiority", "perceptible Azerbaijan's superiority" and "Consolidation Azerbaijan's superiority" the three trends of "negligence", "indecisiveness" and "surprise" can be explained in the process of Iran's foreign policy. During the period of neglect in Iran's foreign policy during the Second Karabakh War, the existence of two narratives "Long-standing religious, cultural and historical ties between Azeris and Iranians and the obligation of the Islamic Republic to support the Shiites" and "Separatist Context in Azeri provinces of Iran", along with the lack of understanding of the ability and will of the Republic of Azerbaijan to recover the occupied lands, caused Iran to not adopt an appropriate policy. Iran, After Baku dominated the areas bordering with Iran, with a late understanding of Azerbaijan's ability and lack of awareness of international, regional and domestic trends, took action by presenting an initiative that repeated Iran's positions in the past years. Due to the unclear details of the plan, the lack of extensive diplomatic activity and the unwillingness of other actors to play Iran's role, this plan didn't succeed. After the control of Shushi by Baku, Armenia accepted defeat and sat down at the negotiating table. From this moment, Azerbaijan wanted to turn the superiority on the battlefield into a diplomatic achievement. Since Iran was not an effective activist in the developments of the war, it couldn't play a role in the subsequent negotiations. The Moscow agreement included nine clauses; Its opening 8 clauses did not contradict the positions of the Iranian authorities. clauses 9 also, if it is only related to the communication corridor and commercial transportation, does not conflict with Iran's interests by itself. The clause related to the Zangezur Corridor has a purpose beyond connecting the two parts of Azerbaijan.  The main contradiction with Iran's interests occurs when claims are made about seizing the territory of Syunik province of Armenia and cutting Iran's land connection with Armenia.
5- CONCLUSIONS & SUGGESTIONS
The macro-narrative of "Karabakh is the land of Islam", lack of internal consensus, appeasement to Russia, enmity with Israel and competition with Turkey and confrontation with the international system were among the factors affecting Iran's activism in this war. three trends of "negligence", "indecisiveness" and "surprise" can be explained in the process of Iran's foreign policy. In this war, Iran neglected the Azerbaijan's power and will, and was unable to create a balance between the two narratives "Long-standing ties and the obligation of the Islamic Republic to support the Shiites" and "Separatist Context in Azeri provinces of Iran", and contented itself with declaring neutrality and verbal activism. After Baku dominated the areas bordering with Iran, with a belated understanding of the will of the Azerbaijan, took action with indecisiveness and due to the lack of clear details of the Innovative plan and the lack of consultation and extensive diplomatic activity, was surprised by clause 9 of the Moscow agreement, which became a pretext for the Zangezur Corridor project. This corridor, which was designed with goals beyond connecting Baku with Nakhchivan, has caused claims by Baku and Ankara on the border of Iran and Armenia. Surely, Iran will seriously oppose this plan. In order to compensate for the losses inflicted on Iran, looking at the Caucasus as a sphere of influence should be the priority of the Islamic Republic. The tension in relations with the republics of the Caucasus is not in Iran's favor. Iran should take steps to reduce the influence of Israel and Turkey and create balance in its cooperation with Russia and Turkey in the region. Stay away from appeasement with Russia, and cooperate with Turkey along with Russia. Also, while balancing relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia, it should play the role of older brother. Paying attention to road and energy diplomacy is also very important to secure the country's interests in the South Caucasus.