Finland's membership in NATO; Changes in the European-Russian balance of power patterns

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Bo Ali University, Hamadan, Iran.

Abstract



The geometry of power in the international system is influenced by the relations of variable power distribution. Finland's membership in NATO has changed many political and international equations. The joining of Finland to NATO not only changed many national equations in Finland, but also brought new events in the regional area (Scandinavia and in the broader Nordic space). In addition, in the international dimension, the foundations of the European balance of power model, which was proposed as a stable model after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, were shaken. The question is why Finland's membership in NATO has changed the security architecture of Europe. In response to this question, the research hypothesis, while paying attention to the shape and content geometry of the power balance between Russia and Europe, will consider the threat balance (Russian resources threatening Finland) as the main factor changing the behavior of Finland's foreign policy.
 

Introduction

Finland's membership in NATO on April 4, 2023 as the 31st NATO member has been one of the most important changes in the shape and content of power geometry in Northern Europe and even Europe. Finland was once a sphere of political influence and implementation of tsarist Russia's policies (until 1917) and even after that and during the Soviet period (from the 1950s onwards), and in the post-Cold War period, it was also trying to achieve its interests. Recognize Russia's security and long-term interests and protect Russian rules of power in terms of security changes. This matter caused the preservation of the rules of power in the bipolar order, convinced the domestic social and political forces about Russia's security concerns and put the principle of good neighborliness with Russia before the security policies of many social and political groups regarding the goals As a European, he minimized Russia's sensitivities towards himself and generally maintained political neutrality and lack of military commitment. Russia's war against Ukraine and Vladimir Putin's aggressive policies towards its eastern neighbors can be considered the most important reason for Finland's accession to NATO. In addition to causing social and political changes in Finland, this issue felt the need to find transnational security arrangements, and finally Finland's desire to become a member of NATO. In addition to the reasons for Finland's accession to NATO, Finland's accession to NATO has created strategic choices; Options similar to neutrality, mediation, balancing, buffering, etc. have expired and no other side of the Russian-European conflict considers Finland a neutral player in foreign policy. These future issues will change Russian-Finnish relations and, on a higher level, Russian-European relations. Now, despite all the efforts, threats, deterrence components and Russia's desire, the Finnish flag has been raised at the NATO headquarters, and the Russian dream of keeping NATO away from Scandinavia has been shattered. Therefore, apart from all the changes that this accession can bring to Finland internally, the claims made regarding the change in the European security architecture can be tested. The question that arises is how the fields of Finland's foreign policy behavior are formulated for NATO membership? In response to this question, while paying attention to the shape and content geometry of the balance of power between Russia and Europe, the threat balance (Russian resources threatening Finland) will be considered as the main factor changing the behavior of Finland's foreign policy.
 
2- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Threat is a category in addition to power and it is created from four specific criteria that governments use to evaluate the threat caused by another country. Therefore, in response to the question of what threatens a state, Walt points to four sources: its power or total strength (size, population, latent power and economic capabilities), geographical proximity, capability aggressiveness and its aggressive or hostile intentions.

Total power: It means "total resources of a government". The greater the total power, the greater the threat that a government can pose.
Geographic proximity: refers to the distance between potential competitors. The greater the distance, the more limited the "ability to project power" and the more limited the potential threat.
Aggressive power: refers to the size of "aggressive capabilities The greater the offensive power, the greater the danger that a state can create.
Aggressive intentions: Intentions refer to how states perceive a potential enemy for this reason, a government may be considered medium or small in terms of resources, but because the perception and understanding of other governments regarding its behavior is aggressive or an immediate threat, balancing against this government as an immediate threat. It is prioritized and creating alliance is prioritized.

 
3- METHODOLOGY
The current research is developmental in terms of its purpose and descriptive-analytical in terms of the researcher's approach. A documentary method has been used to collect data.
 
4- RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The start of the Ukraine war and Russia's invasion of Ukraine pushed Sweden and Finland to a security situation, which created a changing security framework and environment. The war in Ukraine is reminiscent of the traditional European wars. A country whose military expenses are higher than the average of NATO member countries and in terms of political, economic, military position and the position of a developed country will be a pleasant situation for NATO. In general, Russia's military strategies by attacking Ukraine and earlier in its aggressive policies towards Eastern Europe caused the formation of a strategic alliance option for Finland. Finland's behavior can be considered as balancing the threat with Russia; Balancing which has been pursued with the approach of shaping the alliance with NATO. This use of violence by Russia caused Finland and Sweden to be in a situation of great risks, and this great risk was joining NATO and avoiding the traditional policy and strategy of neutrality and non-commitment. In the end, Finland and Sweden, seeing a more bellicose and aggressive Russia, abandoned the holy cow of neutrality and went after NATO as a more security-building option. Russia's attack on the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and then its attack on Ukraine in 2022 have caused Finland to gain a security perception of Russia's aggressive intentions and accept the alliance with NATO from this point of view.
 
5- CONCLUSIONS & SUGGESTIONS
Russia's threats in Eastern and Northern Europe caused the formation of transnational security arrangements or Finland's alliance with NATO. In addition, these threats have created discussions about Sweden's future alliance with NATO. Russia's threats to Finland put this country in an extraordinary state of threat perception and ultimately the strategic choice of forming an alliance with NATO. By turning its back on the tradition of political neutrality and military non-commitment, Finland created a new situation in the Nordic region and the international security environment. From a strategic point of view, some strategic analysts have considered the feature of this accession to fill the "blind spots" of NATO's access to Eastern Europe in the event of a Russian attack. Also, from the military point of view, if Sweden and Finland occupy the Baltic, they can act as a strategic depth and give NATO the opportunity to rearrange forces by land and sea using the Baltic Sea (access from Finland) and by air using Provide the air capacity of Sweden's Gatland. Inferring from the balance of threat theory, Russia's general power situation, Finland's geographical position in the vicinity of Russia, Russia's offensive capabilities towards its neighbors and especially towards Ukraine, and finally Russia's aggressive intentions and the perception in Finland of these Russian aggressive intentions has been created, it seems that Finland's perception towards Russia has caused a change in the strategy of Finland's defense policy and security policy from neutrality to the alliance of the system with NATO.

Keywords


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