Proliferation of Tactical Nuclear Weapons; From Nuclear Deterrence to Nuclear Compellence

The logic of deterrence as one of the solutions and control systems to prevent war has been challenged by the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, coercion means trying to influence another's behavior by using force or threat of force. The question that arises is whether tactical nuclear weapons as a means of strategic coercion have brought the international system into the era of nuclear coercion? The main goal of this research is to achieve a theoretical model in the form of a theoretical model in order to analyze the variables and finally understand the important role of tactical nuclear weapons in contemporary international politics. The research method is descriptive and analytical and corresponds to two steps; In the first step, an attempt is made to examine a theoretical model called the state of structural complexity, which is considered a kind of theoretical arrangement by the author, in order to study the cross-sectional state of the international order (after the Cold War until now) and in The second step related to analysis, relationship and correlation between variables should be examined. According to the research hypothesis, statistics and current trends, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among governments as an efficient tool for applying coercion without possibility they are considered mutual assured destruction.

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, the international system was placed in a state of structural complexity due to variables such as the unipolar structure of the international system, the development of technology, and the development of the international system. According to these changes in the international system, we are witnessing a change in the control system of nuclear deterrence due to the Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question that arises is whether tactical nuclear weapons as a tool of strategic coercion have brought the international system into the era of nuclear coercion? According to the hypothesis of this research, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among governments are considered as an efficient tool to apply coercion without the possibility of mutual assured destruction.
Theoretical Framework
In this research, by emphasizing the theoretical foundations of the state of structural complexity, it is possible to see the act of coercion very differently from the classical system. In structural complexity, instead of the Newtonian and materialistic perspective, it is tried to pay attention to phenomena such as power dynamics and the nature of the international system from a social and semantic framework. When discussing the socialization of the structure of the international system, it means that the actors of the international system use identity and social tools to gain, maintain and increase power. In the past, due to the existence of rationality and predictability, the strategy of coercion was only applied by governments in cases where they could bring reasons based on the rationality of a tool for it. Elements such as non-linear dynamics, coordination and adaptation, unexpected qualities and affairs, and social role networks can each be a stimulus for adopting coercive strategies in contemporary international politics. For example, non-linear dynamics can play a role in creating an imbalance between inputs and outputs, and ultimately, governments will suffer a strategic surprise.

Methodology

The method of this research is to first describe the state of the international order so that it can be examined in the step related to the analysis, connection and correlation between the variables. Data collection is based on the library method.

Results & Discussion

According to the current statistics and trends, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons are considered as an efficient tool for coercion without the possibility of mutual mutual destruction in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among the states. The number of tactical nuclear weapons was in a sharp decline between 1980-1990. This downward trend was more due to the arms control regime of medium-range nuclear forces in 1987 between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. At the operational level, this regime required the removal of ballistic and land-based cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5500 km in a period of three years, along with launchers and related equipment. In a unique feature, it covered nuclear, conventional and dual-use systems, some of which could be considered purely tactical in mission. this decreasing trend has had an increasing trend from 2000 to 2023. The security environment has become very complicated after the weakening of the weapons control regime of medium-range nuclear forces. According to these statistics, there are indications that several countries equipped with nuclear weapons may be thinking of returning to tactical nuclear weapons. For example, some United States and multinational experts and officials explicitly want to increase the tactical capabilities of nuclear weapons.

Conclusions & Suggestions

 The production process of this type of weapons according to published statistics and information can promise the importance of this type of weapons for the purpose of nuclear coercion of states against each other for political interests and compensation for the consequences of negligence. to be strategic in the contemporary international system. The author's only suggestion to return to the era of deterrence is that the states possessing tactical nuclear weapons establish a regime of control and removal of tactical nuclear weapons in order to maintain the deterrence system as in the Cold War period.