Cognitive Biases in Foreign and Global Policy: Examining the Approaches of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani

This study investigates the influence of cognitive biases on the foreign policy approaches of Iranian presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani. Employing the cognitive approach to foreign policy analysis as a theoretical framework, the research utilizes a mixed-method design combining inductive textual analysis of presidential rhetoric with deductive categorization of cognitive biases. The analysis reveals that both presidents exhibited various cognitive biases, including cognitive consistency maintenance, fundamental attribution error, framing effects within gain/loss domains, false consensus, illusions of validity, sunk cost fallacy, and oversimplification tendencies. These biases function as cognitive heuristics, significantly influencing decision-makers' interpretations of critical situations and new information. The study underscores the importance of understanding these cognitive biases in foreign policy formulation, particularly given the Iranian president's role in policy shaping. The article presents a comprehensive analysis, encompassing an introduction, literature review, conceptual framework, methodology, detailed examination of each president's cognitive biases, and conclusion. This research contributes to the broader field of foreign policy analysis by elucidating the role of cognitive biases in shaping presidential decision-making processes in Iran.

Intruduction

Cognitive biases play an important role in the perceptions of decision-makers in the domain of foreign and global policy. These biases function as cognitive heuristics that shape decision-makers' interpretations in critical situations, guiding their judgments through the prism of idiosyncratic framings applied to new information and data. The ramifications of cognitive biases on foreign and global policy perceptions are profound for several reasons. Firstly, decision-makers possess comparatively limited direct experience in the foreign policy realm relative to domestic affairs. Secondly, international issues exhibit heightened complexity and ambiguity. Thirdly, foreign policy decision-makers confront a voluminous influx of novel information and data pertaining to global matters and foreign relations, consequently amplifying the salience of cognitive biases' perceptual components in analyzing and interpreting foreign policy issues. Therefore, considering the Iranian president's relative influence in foreign policy formulation, this article investigates the roles cognitive biases have assumed in shaping the foreign and global policy perspectives of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani.

Theoretical Framework

This article employs a cognitive approach to foreign policy as its conceptual framework. Unlike the rational choice paradigm, which posits that actors seek to maximize utility, the cognitive approach emphasizes the role of cognitive factors in shaping foreign policy decisions. In 1957, Herbert Simon challenged the prevailing assumption of perfect rationality in decision-making. The cognitive approach argues that rational choice models fail to account for individuals' cognitive constraints and mental frameworks. Instead, cognitive approaches analyze how these frameworks and perceptual biases influence the decision-making process.Cognitive biases, defined as systematic deviations from normative models of judgment based on cognitive limitations and tendencies, play a crucial role in this framework. These biases include cognitive dissonance, fundamental attribution error, prospect theory (gain/loss framing), false consensus effect, opinion validation bias, sunk cost fallacy, and cognitive simplification. This study aims to investigate the impact of these cognitive biases on the foreign and global policies of two Iranian presidents, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani, offering a comparative analysis of their decision-making processes through the lens of cognitive theory.
3.Methodology
The present study employs the cognitive approach to foreign policy analysis as its conceptual framework. The cognitive approach occupies a middle ground between the psychoanalytic and rational choice approaches. Psychoanalytic approaches primarily concentrate on the influence of individual psychological and personality traits on foreign policy decision-making. In contrast, rational choice approaches regard decision-makers as individuals with fixed and well-defined preferences who engage in precise rational calculations to assess the probable consequences of each action before making a choice. One of the most salient concepts within the cognitive sciences is that of cognitive bias, which refers to a systematic pattern of deviation from rationality in judgment and decision-making, caused by inherent thought processes and mental heuristics. These biases can manifest as tendencies, attitudes, illusions, or misconceptions, and exert an unconscious influence on individuals' judgment, decision-making processes, reasoning, evaluations, recollections, perceptions, and cognition.The study adopts an inductive strategy and textual analysis methodology to explore cognitive biases manifest in the two presidents' rhetoric, complemented by a deductive approach to categorize these biases systematically. Innovatively, this represents the first empirical examination of cognitive biases in Iranian presidential discourses. The article sequentially presents an introduction, literature review, conceptual framework, methodology, analyses of Ahmadinejad's and Rouhani's respective cognitive biases, and conclusion.

Result and discussion

The analysis revealed that the cognitive biases exhibited by former Iranian Presidents Ahmadinejad and Rouhani could be categorized as instances of maintaining cognitive consistency, the fundamental attribution error, framing effects within the gain/loss domains, false consensus and illusions of validity, the sunk cost fallacy, and oversimplification tendencies. A comparative examination of the two presidents' cognitive biases yields the following observations:
 

Cognitive Consistency: Both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani displayed a propensity to preserve cognitive consistency in their foreign and global policy stances. Ahmadinejad attempted to interpret the realities of the power-oriented international system through the prism of his justice-oriented worldviews. Confronted with the harsh realities of international politics, he advocated altering those realities to maintain cognitive consistency. Conversely, Rouhani, who harbored high expectations for negotiations with the United States, claimed after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA that this action was consistent with previous hostile U.S. behavior patterns, which his administration had long anticipated, thereby preserving his cognitive consistency.
Oversimplification: The two presidents exhibited a tendency to oversimplify complex issues. Ahmadinejad minimized the impact and significance of international power dynamics and instruments, such as sanctions, while Rouhani envisioned the legal lifting of sanctions under the JCPOA as a precursor to extensive cooperation between Iran and the global community.
Attribution Error: Ahmadinejad attributed the country's problems primarily to the incompetence and ineptitude of previous administrations, whereas Rouhani blamed the economic and psychological warfare waged by adversaries. Both presidents externalized the causes of problems to environmental factors beyond their control.
Framing Effects: Ahmadinejad framed Iran's rapidly progressing nuclear program as a desirable state of affairs, with any deviation from it leading to a loss of Iranian interests. Even when negotiating parties addressed Iran, he insisted on their full acceptance and recognition of Iran's nuclear program. Conversely, Rouhani believed that Iran's nuclear program had placed the country in the domain of absolute loss, i.e., the possibility of military conflict with the United States. Consequently, he entered the arena with the stated goal of advancing nuclear negotiations and extricating the country from the specter of war.
False Consensus and Illusion of Validity: Both presidents exhibited a high degree of false consensus within their advisory circles and an illusion of validity. Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial and Rouhani's repeated verbal attacks on critics of his administration were indicative of this cognitive bias.

 

Sunk Cost Fallacy: Ahmadinejad and Rouhani both demonstrated resistance to altering their foreign policy strategies regarding the nuclear program. Ahmadinejad referred to an unstoppable nuclear train, while Rouhani continued to harbor hopes in European promises for a year after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, considering Iran's withdrawal from the deal as playing into Trump's hands.
Conclusions & Suggestions

Advancements in cognitive sciences have elucidated the significant impact of leaders' perceptual structures and cognitive biases on their positions, actions, and decisions in foreign and global policy. These cognitive biases can influence behaviors and actions that would otherwise be expected from a rational actor. The mainstream international relations theories tend to overlook these perceptual aspects. However, contemporary theories in foreign policy analysis, drawing from cognitive psychology approaches, have placed their primary focus on analyzing perceptual components in foreign policy. Despite this shift, the dominant intellectual current in Iranian foreign policy analysis remains heavily influenced by state-centric realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives, with insufficient attention paid to the perceptual and cognitive dimensions of foreign policy. Addressing this research gap, the central question of this article is: What role have cognitive biases played in shaping the foreign policy perspectives of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani? A review of existing literature revealed that while some perceptual elements such as cognitive mapping, personality constructs, and operational codes have been utilized in studies of Iranian foreign policy, there has been a lack of research specifically examining the role of cognitive biases. This article aims to fill this void. The conceptual framework of this research, grounded in the perceptual theory of foreign policy, posits that certain aspects of Iran's foreign and global policy positions, actions, and decisions during the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations cannot be adequately analyzed through the lens of mainstream international relations theories. Instead, it argues for the necessity of moving beyond these rationality-centered perspectives to consider perceptual factors, particularly cognitive biases. Various types of these biases were identified through a review of theoretical literature and subsequently applied to analyze selected texts reflecting the views of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani. The research findings demonstrate that the cognitive biases of both leaders can be analyzed within the framework of cognitive dissonance, attribution error, prospect theory (gain/loss framing), false consensus effect/illusion of validity, sunk cost fallacy, and simplification bias. This study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of Iranian foreign policy decision-making, highlighting the importance of cognitive factors in shaping diplomatic strategies and international relations beyond traditional rationalist explanations.