China's resurgence and the prospects for maritime strategy transformation

The rise of China has placed the importance of a new geopolitical space, that is, a space that stretches from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and East Africa, at the center of gravity of regional and international order-building. This space is a “blue” space, and certainly the dominance of each of the great and regional powers over this space can play a significant role in how it shapes the future of this order. In order to escape the mentality of a “victim” actor and also to escape “geopolitical suffocation” after almost 500 years of focusing on land, the People’s Republic of China has been trying to rebuild its navy since the 1950s and has increased its interest in the ocean, and this effort seems to be bearing fruit today, under the fifth generation of Chinese leaders. This article attempts to examine the developments in China's maritime strategies using the process-finding method and to state that a kind of transition from defensive realism to offensive realism has taken place in China's maritime strategy.

Introduction

A persistent and recurring pattern in the history of international relations—particularly since the first half of the nineteenth century—has been the effort and desire of major powers to possess strong naval forces for the purpose of protecting expanding commercial and economic interests, attaining prestige, projecting themselves as great powers, striving for dominance at sea, and ultimately preventing rival and enemy powers from gaining control in this domain. What is evident is that the scope of this “strategic aspiration” to become a major naval power has now reached China, making it the latest land-based power attempting to transform into a maritime power. This effort has been seriously pursued by the country’s fifth-generation leadership, especially Xi Jinping, and has gained further strength with the emergence of the slogan “Chinese Dream.” China’s resurgence and revitalization have placed the importance of a new geopolitical expanse—stretching from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and East Africa—at the center of regional and international order formation.

Theoretical Framework

China's resurgence and the increase in its national capacity and power have had significant effects on China's national grand strategies and efforts to restore its national greatness, especially through the modernization of military capabilities, as well as the evolution of the country's maritime security strategies and its transition from a force focused on "coastal defense" to "near sea defense" and finally to "distant water defense". In the following, an attempt has been made to examine this transition in China's maritime security strategies from the perspective of realist approaches to offensive and defensive structures, and from the time of Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, relying on the maritime strategic documents of the People's Republic of China, the country's gradual externalization and presence in peripheral waters as well as the Indian Ocean, and the evolution in the missions of the country's navy.
3.Methodology
Given the importance of this issue and the necessity of gaining a clearer understanding of the transformations in the grand national strategies of the actors present in this domain—particularly the People’s Republic of China and its navy—and of offering a broad picture of developments in China’s naval strategies, this article seeks to address the question of how China’s maritime security strategies have changed in line with the country’s growing power and national capability, from the time of Deng Xiaoping to that of Xi Jinping. Relying on the hypothesis that a form of shift—namely, a transition from defensive realism to offensive realism—has occurred in China’s maritime security strategy, this study applies a process-tracing method to examine and assess that transformation.

Results & Discussion

This expanse is a maritime one, and undoubtedly, control over it by any major or regional power can play a significant role in shaping the future of this order. In order to move beyond the mindset of a “victim” actor and also to escape what it called “geopolitical suffocation,” the People’s Republic of China—after nearly 500 years of land-centered focus—resumed its efforts to rebuild its naval forces in the 1950s. At the same time, it increased its interest in the ocean, albeit with a “Janus-like” perspective—that is, viewing the ocean as both a source of opportunity and a source of threat. These efforts appear to have borne fruit under the fifth generation of Chinese leadership, shifting China’s position from a country traditionally “continental-oriented” to one increasingly “maritime-oriented.”
In addition, China’s 2015 Defense White Paper states that the traditional mindset—that land is superior to sea—must be abandoned, and that greater importance should be attached to the management of seas and oceans as well as the protection of China’s maritime rights. The navy is expected to gradually shift its focus from the defense of “near seas” to “far seas”—a shift that bears considerable resemblance to the “Mahanian school” of maritime security. It should be noted, however, that from 1949 to the late 1970s, China condemned the “Mahanian” model of maritime security as an attempt to rationalize “imperialist colonialism” in East Asia. It argued that Mahan had provided the U.S. imperialists with a blueprint for restoring colonies and pursuing global hegemony, and that he merely represented the interests and objectives of capitalists. Yet, over time, and with China’s growing power, the country appears to be moving toward the “Mahanian” theory and model of maritime security—one that, moreover, has a close affinity with the theories of offensive structural realism.

Conclusions & Suggestions

In fact, since 2012, "transforming China into a great maritime power" has become an integral part of China's grand strategy, and Beijing has committed itself to a long-term effort to achieve this goal. An effort that not only did not stop with the coming to power of Xi Jinping from 2013 onwards, but also moved forward at a faster pace and even acquired more aggressive dimensions. In summary, and based on what has been stated, a kind of transition in China's maritime security strategy, namely the transition from coastal defense to near-sea defense and distant sea defense, has taken place in line with China's increasing national power and capability, transforming the country from a passive and defensive position in the maritime domain to an active and aggressive one.
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