China's AI Development Goals in International Relations (2006-2024)

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Professor of Political Science Department, University of Guilan,, Rasht, Iran.

2 Ph.D. Student in International Relations, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran.

10.22124/wp.2025.29631.3469

Abstract

The People's Republic of China has been ranked second globally in artificial intelligence (AI) and has been regarded as one of the top countries in terms of investment in smart technologies since 2006. This study seeks to employ the theory of neoclassical realism to identify the objectives China pursues through investment in AI and related technologies within the realm of international relations in the first half of the 21st century. China's goals for artificial intelligence development in the context of international relations include the state's economic and industrial development, aiming to influence the international financial system and showcase the Chinese economic development model. Furthermore, these goals involve narrowing China's military gap with major powers, increasing its impact on global peace and security, expanding international influence, and eventually achieving a peaceful shift in the international balance of power. The article's novelty lies in its application of the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism and the use of integrated content analysis as the research method. Data were collected using library and internet-based resources.

Introduction

A review of China's AI strategy documents and statements from its senior leaders through the framework of international relations theory from the early 2000s to the present can elucidate the contexts and objectives of China’s investment in AI and associated technologies. China was among the first countries to establish a foundation for the development and progress of smart technology through “The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)”. In addition to this fifteen-year plan, other pieces of this puzzle that explain the backgrounds and objectives of China’s investment in AI include Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2011-2015), Internet+, Internet+ Artificial Intelligence Three-Year Action and Implementation Plan (2016-2018), the ten-year plan of Made in China 2025, 13th Five-Year Plan for National Science and Technology Innovation (2016-2020), the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), the Robotics Industry Development Plan (2016-2020), Artificial Intelligence Plan 2.0, Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018-2020), the 14th Five-Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China, Eastern Data and Western Computing, Action Plan for Informatization Standards Construction (2024-2027), AI Plus (2024), etc. These plans and initiatives have been less addressed in existing studies because most authors have based their analyses and conclusions on only one or two strategic documents published in 2015 and 2017. Considering the volume of Chinese investments in AI, the innovative aspect of this study lies in the analysis of China's AI strategy documents and statements from its senior leaders through the framework of theories of international relations to elucidate the contexts and objectives of China’s investment in AI and associated technologies. Therefore, this study employs the theory of neoclassical realism to identify the objectives China pursues through investment in AI and related technologies within the realm of international relations in the first half of the 21st century. This study hypothesizes that China's short-term objectives of investing in AI and smart technologies include increasing national power through economic and military enhancements, promoting domestic prosperity, exerting greater control over minority populations, and introducing China as an AI hub by 2030 to bolster the country’s international political and technological influence, and the long-term objective of these investments is to steer the international system towards a multipolar order in order to elevate China's global standing.
2.Theoretical Framework
A group of realist theorists, referred to as “neoclassical realists” by Gideon Rose, endeavored to synthesize and modernize classical realism and neorealism by integrating both systemic and unitary variables into their analytical framework. They argue that domestic variables cannot affect foreign policy behavior independently of structural variables; however, they can intervene in the systemic motivations and foreign policy actions of countries. In fact, neoclassical realists view the international system as the independent variable and decision-makers perceptions of its constraints and pressures, state structure, and societal nature as mediating variables. Then they try to analyze the behavior of governments as a dependent variable by addressing the following three critical topics: how governments mobilize resources, the role of domestic actors in hindering this mobilization, and the factors that determine the success of negotiations between the government and social groups.

Methodology

This article uses the integrated content analysis as the research method. Data were collected using library and internet-based resources.

Discussion

The development of The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) provided the primary areas of Chinese investment in smart technologies. According to the theory of neoclassical realism, the perceptions of China's senior leaders regarding systemic limitations and internal challenges serve as a mediating variable. This perspective has triggered the development of AI and smart technologies, which are prominently featured in China's strategic documents and articulated by senior political and military figures. Consequently, there is a prevailing belief that leveraging these technologies will enable China to achieve national objectives across economic, military, and domestic policy domains in the short term, and enhance its international influence and promote a multipolar international system in the long term.

Conclusions & Suggestions

This study employed the frameworks of the neoclassical realism theory to analyze China’s AI strategic documents and plans as well as the statements of its senior leaders in this regard to elucidate the contexts and objectives of China’s investments in AI and other smart technologies in the first half of the 21st century. Results indicated that China's goals for artificial intelligence development in the context of international relations include the state's economic and industrial development, aiming to influence the international financial system and showcase the Chinese economic development model. Furthermore, these goals involve narrowing China's military gap with major powers, increasing its impact on global peace and security, expanding international influence, and eventually achieving a peaceful shift in the international balance of power

Keywords


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