استراتژی دفاعی و امنیتی کیشیدا در برابر شکاف ژئوپلیتیکی چین وتایوان (2024-2021)

The dynamics and fundamental in shifts East Asian geopolitics, coupled with emerging security threats such as the China-Taiwan geopolitical rift, have prompted Japan to reassess its defense and security strategy. Consequently, Japan has altered its strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, elevating it to a grand strategic priority. In this geopolitical rift, China represents the most significant strategic challenge, capable of upsetting the current security dynamics and regional equilibrium to Japan's detriment through the potential seizure of Taiwan. Therefore, the critical question is: How can Japan's response to Taiwan's heightened defense-security significance be understood? The hypothesis suggests that within the framework of Kishida's defense-security documents, Japan adopts an active balancing strategy against China, involving substantial investment in defense affairs, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, establishing regional power balancing, and deterrence. The research findings indicate that to prevent a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Kishida, by adopting a balancing and containment strategy within Japan's new defense architecture, has extended the depth of cross-domain deterrence to the Taiwan Strait. Through realistic defense diplomacy, in addition to increasing Japan's participation in the U.S. integrated deterrence network to contain China, he is creating a new integrated regional security order and deterrence network based on security-defense cooperation within the framework of alliances and security pacts with like-minded countries against a potential Chinese military action against Taiwan. The research method is descriptive-analytical, utilizing an analysis of the most important national defense documents, analyses by East Asian defense experts, and security studies centers.

Introduction

Before Shinzo Abe's tenure as prime minister (2012-2020), based on the Yoshida Doctrine's sheltering strategy of cooperative engagement, Japanese officials adopted a passive defense-security approach toward a potential Chinese military action against Taiwan and its implications for Japan's security. Abe's competitive engagement strategy regarding a potential Chinese military action against Taiwan departed from the Yoshida Defensive Doctrine to a limited extent, yet the Yoshida Defensive Doctrine still dominated Abe's defense policy, wherein Japan's response was defensive and defined as strategic ambiguity. With Fumio Kishida's assumption of power in October 2021, driven by an understanding of the security threats arising from China's increasing strategic dominance over East Asia and its threats toward Taiwan, he instilled a more proactive realism compared to Abe based on a "realistic defense diplomacy" in his defense and security doctrine, comprehensively departing from the Yoshida Defensive Doctrine. Influenced by this process, the shifting regional balance against Japan, and the perceived impending threats, Japan aims to pursue a strategy of balancing and containment through its geopolitical outreach against China. This suggests that during the Kishida era, China's threats against Taiwan were increasingly viewed as an "existential crisis” that jeopardized Japan's survival. These developments indicate that Japan, recognizing Taiwan's strategic importance, has abandoned its passive stance toward Taiwan and is committed to its defense; thus, Taiwan has become a grand strategic priority for Kishida, prompting the formulation of a defense and security strategy against a potential Chinese military action against Taiwan. Therefore, the critical question is: How can Japan's response to Taiwan's heightened defense-security significance be understood? The hypothesis posits that within the framework of Kishida's defense-security documents, Japan adopts an active balancing strategy against China, involving substantial investment in defense affairs, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, establishing regional power balancing, and deterrence.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework is based on regional power balancing. The power balancing security system has three main indicators: containment strategy, deterrence, and the balance indicator. Containment policy utilizes regional alliances and a global strategy encompassing military, economic, and political components to contain the country in question that conflicts with the global hegemonic order. Alliances formed for deterrence purposes fall within this framework. In hard balancing, countries adopt strategies to develop and update their military capabilities and establish and maintain formal, reciprocal alliances and coalitions to match their primary adversaries' capabilities. In soft balancing, states generally establish limited security agreements or understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or rising power. Soft balancing often relies on limited arms buildup, temporary collaborative exercises, or cooperation within regional or international institutions. Defensive realism advocates limited and minimum balancing, while offensive realism favors extensive and maximum balancing. Additionally, the deterrence system is structured based on realism. Deterrence is dynamically evolving with new technologies, and the fifth wave of cross-domain deterrence is emerging. Cross-domain deterrence involves using threats in one domain to deter activities in (an) other domain(s). Accordingly, cross-domain deterrence encompasses deterrent efforts on land, sea, undersea, air, space, and cyber, accompanied by economic sanctions and other non-military tools.

Research Method

The research employs a descriptive-analytical approach, analyzing key national defense documents, insights from defense experts specializing in East Asia, and contributions from security studies centers. This method not only portrays the existing conditions but also elucidates the underlying reasons and strategic dimensions involved.

Results and Discussion

The research findings reveal that Prime Minister Kishida, to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, has implemented a balancing and containment strategy within Japan's revamped defense framework, extending cross-domain deterrence to the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, through pragmatic defense diplomacy and increased involvement in the U.S. integrated deterrence network, Japan is fostering a new regional security order. This effort is underpinned by security-defense cooperation within alliances and security pacts with like-minded nations, aimed at countering potential Chinese military aggression against Taiwan.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As the strategic center of the Indo-Pacific network connected to NATO's and the U.S.'s integrated deterrence networks, Japan imposes strategic constraints on a potential Chinese move against Taiwan. Among Japan's security pacts with regional countries, the Japan-U.S. alliance, due to shared security interests, high strategic convergence, and joint political will, would exhibit the greatest involvement in a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. If deterrence fails and conflict erupts between China and Japan in the Taiwan Strait, the United States will not avoid direct confrontation with China and, unlike in Ukraine, will not consider a "proxy war" as an option, as non-intervention would severely undermine its global credibility and hegemony, leaving it no longer a global power.