نقش ایران در سقوط حکومت عبدالکریم قاسم در عراق (1963-1958)

Since the establishment of modern Iraq in 1920, the relationship between Iran and Iraq has been marked by political, security, and geopolitical fluctuations. The July 1958 coup and the rise of the republican regime under Abd al-Karim Qasim inaugurated a new phase of strategic rivalry between the two countries. Qasim’s government, grounded in Arab nationalism and socialist tendencies, fostered political divergence from Iran and contributed to a shift in the regional balance of power. As border disputes—particularly over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the Khuzestan issue—intensified, and with growing Iranian concerns about Soviet influence in Iraq, the Pahlavi regime sought to manage the risks posed by developments in Baghdad. This study thus seeks to answer the central question: What role did Iran, under Mohammad Reza Shah, play in the process of weakening and ultimately toppling Qasim’s regime? Based on historical documents and regional dynamics analysis, the findings indicate that while the main causes of Qasim’s downfall lay in internal power struggles, military rivalries, and a failure to stabilize the political order, Iran also played a significant indirect role—particularly through political and intelligence support for opposition groups—in accelerating the collapse of his republican regime..

Introduction

Since its establishment in 1920, Iraq has been a critical actor in Middle Eastern geopolitics, positioned at the crossroads of the Arab and non-Arab Muslim worlds. The Kingdom of Iraq, under Hashemite rule, was aligned with Western powers, including Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty. This alignment was formalized through participation in the Baghdad Pact, reflecting a shared interest in containing Soviet influence. However, the political landscape shifted dramatically following the July 14, 1958 military coup led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim. The newly established republic withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and aligned itself with the Eastern Bloc. Qasim's revolutionary rhetoric and territorial claims over the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzestan significantly deteriorated Iran-Iraq relations. This study examines the extent and nature of Iran’s role under Mohammad Reza Shah in the eventual downfall of Qasim’s regime between 1958 and 1963.
2.Analytical Framework
In the context of the Cold War, Iran's foreign policy toward Iraq was influenced by both systemic pressures (East–West rivalry) and domestic political imperatives. The study also considers the role of ideational threats, such as revolutionary republicanism and pan-Arabism, in shaping Iranian threat perceptions. Qasim’s ideological orientation and his rejection of monarchical systems challenged the legitimacy of the Shah's rule, prompting Tehran to recalibrate its Iraq policy. Thus, the analytical framework emphasizes the interplay of ideological antagonism, regional rivalry, and superpower alignments in explaining Iran’s strategic behavior toward Qasim’s government.

Methodology

This research is based on historical-analytical methods using primary and secondary sources, including diplomatic documents, memoirs, and archival materials.

Discussion and Findings

The findings suggest that Iran's response to Qasim’s regime evolved over time, transitioning from diplomatic recognition and cautious engagement to indirect confrontation and covert opposition. Initially, Iran sought to maintain cordial relations by promptly recognizing the new Iraqi republic. However, Qasim’s confrontational stance—particularly his support for Arab separatism in Khuzestan and his demands over the Shatt al-Arab—was interpreted in Tehran as a direct challenge to Iran's territorial integrity and national unity. Iran’s foreign policy began to shift under the influence of both domestic concerns and pressure from its Western allies, especially the United States. As Qasim drew closer to the Soviet Union, Iran became increasingly alarmed and began exploring non-military strategies to contain him. One notable episode was Iran’s tacit support for the failed Mosul coup in 1959, carried out by pro-Western Iraqi officers. Furthermore, Tehran increased its support for Kurdish insurgents in northern Iraq as a means of pressuring Baghdad. Despite these actions, the study finds that the primary drivers of Qasim’s downfall were internal: factionalism within the military, the alienation of key political allies, and his failure to institutionalize a stable political order. Nevertheless, Iranian actions played a supplementary role in weakening Qasim’s position and emboldening his rivals. The Pahlavi regime viewed Qasim as both a geopolitical and ideological threat and sought to capitalize on his vulnerabilities without engaging in direct confrontation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this research confirms that Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah played a non-negligible but indirect role in the fall of Abd al-Karim Qasim’s regime. While Iran was not a primary agent in orchestrating Qasim’s overthrow, it actively contributed to his regime’s weakening by supporting opposition elements and leveraging its geopolitical tools. Iran’s strategic response was shaped by a combination of threat perception, regional rivalry, and alliance politics during the Cold War. The Pahlavi government initially pursued a policy of cautious engagement, recognizing the new republic and expressing willingness to normalize bilateral relations. However, the escalation of border disputes, ideological hostility, and Qasim’s pivot toward the USSR led Tehran to adopt a more assertive posture. Iran’s indirect actions—such as supporting Kurdish rebels and endorsing anti-Qasim factions—highlight its use of soft coercion to influence regional outcomes.
Importantly, the case of Iran-Iraq relations during this period underscores how middle powers operate within a constrained international system, employing asymmetric strategies when direct intervention is unfeasible. It also illustrates the significance of ideological and symbolic dimensions of foreign policy in addition to traditional geopolitical calculations. Ultimately, while the fall of Qasim was primarily driven by Iraq’s internal political dynamics, Iran’s calibrated opposition and indirect involvement served as catalytic factors that accelerated the regime’s demise. This case study contributes to a deeper understanding of regional statecraft, proxy competition, and the limits of foreign influence in shaping regime change in the Middle East
.