چشم‌انداز توسعه انرژی هسته‌ای عراق در پرتو رژیم بین‌المللی منع اشاعه و تکثیر سلاح‌های هسته‌ای

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیارگروه علوم سیاسی و روابط بین الملل، واحد شهرضا، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، شهرضا، ایران

2 دانشجوى دکترى گروه روابط بین الملل، واحد اصفهان (خوراسگان)، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامى، اصفهان، ایران

3 استادیار گروه علوم سیاسى نظام های سیاسی و سیاست های عمومی ، دانشگاه کربلا، کربلا، عراق.

10.22124/wp.2025.31486.3578

چکیده

در چند دهه اخیر، گرایش دولت‌ها به توسعه انرژی هسته‌ای در نظام بین‌الملل به‌طور چشمگیری افزایش یافته است. اهمیت انرژی هسته‌ای در حوزه‌های مختلفی همچون پزشکی، کشاورزی، محیط زیست و به‌ویژه تولید انرژی برق، نقش کلیدی در انگیزه کشورهای مختلف برای سرمایه‌گذاری در فناوری‌های هسته‌ای ایفا کرده است. همزمان، معاهدات بین‌المللی از جمله پیمان منع گسترش سلاح‌های هسته‌ای و آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی به‌عنوان نهاد نظارتی، نقش محوری در مدیریت توسعه انرژی هسته‌ای و جلوگیری از دستیابی کشورها به سلاح هسته‌ای داشته‌اند. عراق نیز در دوره پساصدام با تأسیس سازمان انرژی اتمی در سال ۲۰۱۶ گامی مهم برای دستیابی به انرژی هسته‌ای برداشته است. با این حال، توسعه برنامه هسته‌ای عراق با محدودیت‌هایی مواجه است. یافته‌های این پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که محدودیت‌های بین‌المللی در چارچوب پیمان‌ها و معاهدات، به‌ویژه پیمان منع گسترش سلاح‌های هسته‌ای، مهم‌ترین عامل بازدارنده توسعه انرژی هسته‌ای عراق محسوب می‌شوند. علاوه بر این، برداشت‌های تهدیدآمیز از برنامه هسته‌ای دوران حزب بعث حساسیت جامعه بین‌المللی نسبت به این برنامه را افزایش داده است. این تحقیق با رویکرد توصیفی-تحلیلی و با بهره‌گیری از منابع کتابخانه‌ای انجام شده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Prospects of Iraq’s Nuclear Energy Development under the International Regime for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

نویسندگان [English]

  • bashir esmaili ghanharani 1
  • Kerar Haidar Mojed Mashhadi 2
  • Sadeq Al-Ghazi Haidar Fawzi 3
1 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Shahreza Branch, Islamic Azad University, Shahreza, Iran
2 PhD student, Department of International Relations, Isfahan (Khorasgan) Branch, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Political Systems and Public Policies, University of Karbala, Karbala, Iraq.
چکیده [English]

In recent decades, states’ interest in developing nuclear energy has significantly increased in the international system. The importance of nuclear energy across diverse sectors, including medicine, agriculture, the environment, and especially electricity generation, has been a key driver for countries to invest in nuclear technology. Simultaneously, international treaties, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a supervisory body, play a central role in managing nuclear energy development and preventing state access to nuclear weapons. Post-Saddam Iraq, through the establishment of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in 2016, took a substantial step toward accessing nuclear energy. Nevertheless, Iraq’s nuclear program faces limitations. Findings indicate that international restrictions under treaties, particularly the NPT, constitute the main impediment to Iraq’s nuclear energy development. Moreover, the perceived threats associated with Iraq’s nuclear program during the Baath era have heightened international sensitivity. This study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach using library and online resources to investigate these constraints.
 
 

Introduction

The global resurgence of interest in nuclear energy has reshaped the international energy and security landscape over the past decades. States across diverse regions increasingly view nuclear technology as a critical component of their national development strategies, not only for its role in power generation but also for its applications in medicine, agriculture, industry, and environmental protection. Nuclear energy has thus become a dual-faceted issue: a driver of sustainable energy transitions and a source of geopolitical tension due to its potential linkages with weapons development. Against this background, international institutions and regimes, most notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency, have sought to regulate the peaceful use of nuclear energy while simultaneously constraining proliferation risks. Iraq presents a particularly complex case within this global debate. After decades of conflict, sanctions, and the dismantling of its earlier nuclear ambitions under the Ba’ath regime, Iraq has recently sought to revive nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The establishment of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the post-2016 period signals a strategic shift aimed at diversifying energy resources, enhancing food and health security, and reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Yet, Iraq’s nuclear trajectory is constrained by structural, historical, and political factors that differentiate it from other emerging nuclear energy states. Historical legacies of mistrust stemming from Iraq’s former clandestine programs continue to shape international perceptions. Simultaneously, the complex web of international treaties and security concerns imposes external constraints on Iraq’s nuclear policy. This study situates Iraq’s nuclear ambitions within the broader international non-proliferation framework and investigates the key obstacles it faces in translating policy intent into operational capability. By examining Iraq’s domestic initiatives, legal frameworks, and international engagements, the research contributes to a deeper understanding of the tension between sovereign energy ambitions and the global non-proliferation regime.

Theoretical Framework

The research is grounded in international regime theory, which emphasizes the role of institutions, norms, and treaties in shaping state behavior in issue areas characterized by interdependence and collective security concerns. In the nuclear field, regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, and related agreements embody a complex network of obligations and monitoring mechanisms that constrain national autonomy. By distinguishing between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, the Non-Proliferation Treaty institutionalizes a hierarchical system that both restricts proliferation and promises access to peaceful nuclear technology. Within this framework, Iraq is formally entitled to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but remains subject to stringent safeguards and international oversight. The legacy of Iraq’s previous violations under the Ba’athist regime further amplifies the salience of regime constraints, making Iraq’s nuclear policy a test case for the resilience of global non-proliferation norms. The application of regime theory highlights how international institutions can both enable and restrict access to nuclear technology, illustrating the tension between sovereignty and global governance.

Methodology

This study employs a descriptive–analytical approach that combines a review of international treaties, legal documents, and institutional reports with an examination of secondary scholarly literature. Data have been collected primarily from library resources, international organization archives, and online databases. By applying qualitative analysis, the study identifies patterns in Iraq’s nuclear policy trajectory and evaluates the interplay between domestic initiatives and international constraints. This methodological framework allows for a balanced assessment of Iraq’s opportunities and limitations in nuclear energy development.

Results and Discussion

Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear energy in the post-Saddam era reflects a strategic response to energy insecurity, environmental challenges, and the need for technological modernization. Domestically, the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, the passing of legislation, and efforts to build institutional capacity represent significant steps toward re-establishing nuclear infrastructure. Iraq’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, particularly through technical cooperation agreements covering medicine, agriculture, waste management, and reactor decommissioning, indicates a deliberate attempt to align with global norms and reassure the international community of its peaceful intentions. However, several obstacles undermine Iraq’s ambitions. First, international skepticism rooted in historical experiences with Iraq’s clandestine programs under the Ba’ath regime has produced a persistent atmosphere of distrust. This constrains Iraq’s ability to secure advanced technology transfers and investment partnerships. Second, the structural requirements of nuclear development—ranging from financial resources to skilled human capital and technological infrastructure—pose formidable challenges for a country still grappling with political instability and post-conflict reconstruction. Third, the global non-proliferation regime imposes layered restrictions, ensuring that Iraq’s nuclear activities remain under rigorous monitoring. While these mechanisms are designed to prevent diversion toward military uses, they also slow down Iraq’s capacity-building and create dependency on international assistance. Despite these challenges, Iraq’s active participation in international forums such as Atomexpo signals a determination to engage with global nuclear stakeholders, including Russia, China, and European partners. Such engagement highlights Iraq’s attempt to balance its domestic aspirations with external oversight. Ultimately, Iraq’s nuclear program is shaped by the interplay between sovereign developmental goals and the normative structures of the non-proliferation regime, making its trajectory both cautious and contested.

Conclusions and Suggestions.

The Iraqi case underscores the broader dilemmas faced by states seeking to expand peaceful nuclear energy under the shadow of restrictive international regimes and legacies of mistrust. While Iraq has taken meaningful steps to reestablish its nuclear sector, including institutional reforms, legislative frameworks, and international partnerships, its progress remains constrained by external suspicion and internal capacity deficits. The study reveals that Iraq’s nuclear ambitions are not merely a technical or energy issue but a deeply political process shaped by history, regime structures, and international security concerns. On the one hand, nuclear energy offers Iraq a pathway to diversify its energy mix, reduce reliance on fossil fuels, and expand benefits in medicine, agriculture, and industry. On the other hand, the persistent association of Iraq with past proliferation activities has created enduring barriers that cannot be easily dismantled. Moving forward, Iraq’s success will depend on building long-term trust with the international community, strengthening regulatory transparency, and securing diversified partnerships with established nuclear powers. At the same time, the international regime must reconcile the tension between enabling access to peaceful nuclear technology and preventing proliferation, ensuring that states like Iraq are not indefinitely marginalized. The case of Iraq thus exemplifies the complex balance between sovereignty and global governance, highlighting both the promises and pitfalls of nuclear energy development under the current non-proliferation order

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Iraq
  • Nuclear Energy
  • International Treaties
  • NPT
 
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