نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
دانشکده اقتصاد و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The shared gas fields in the Persian Gulf , particularly South Pars and Arash, are among Iran’s most important hydrocarbon resources,. However, Iran’s interaction patterns in these two fields have taken different forms: in South Pars, a kind of “unequal cooperation” prevails, and in Arash, “conflicting competition.” The main question is which variable(s) has determined this difference in patterns. The research hypothesis is that the “existence of a shared institutional regime” is the most important factor that has led to two different patterns through its impact on transaction costs, shadow of the future , and the cohesion of regional alliances. The research uses a comparative case study method and an international political economy as the main theoretical approach. The findings show that in South Pars, the existence of the 1971 border agreement has reduced transaction costs and lengthened the shadow of the future, but structural power asymmetry and internal institutional weaknesses have pushed cooperation towards inequality, and in the Arash field, the lack of a border agreement and a common legal regime has increased transaction costs and established a pattern of competition in this field.
کلیدواژهها [English]