عنوان مقاله [English]
Iran’s immediate response to the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal was not a full resumption of its nuclear activities. Instead, Tehran tried to salvage the deal. This behavior is quite different from Iran’s nuclear policy in the time span from 2005 to 2013 when Iran tried to advance its nuclear program despite the sanctions. In this paper, the question is: why Iran was insisting on its maximum advancement of its nuclear program during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but sought reconciliation under Ruhani and tried to salvage the nuclear deal after the US withdrawal? To answer this question, using the analytical-descriptive method, some cognitive theories are applied. The cognitive view demonstrates that Iran’s policy makers perception of being in the win domain during Ahmadinejad presidency, led them to consider a nuclear reconciliation a loss that cannot be made for by the received advantages. The change in the Iranian policy makers’ perception about the costs of the nuclear deal and the placement of the country in the loss domain, led to the gradual readiness for an agreement and then salvaging it. In the same vein, the justice seeking attitude of Ahmadinejad on one hand and the unjust quality of the great powers’ proposals on the other hand, resulted in the rejection of such proposals; in contrast, the interactive attitude of Ruhani in addition to the readiness of the great powers to hold a balance in securing Iran’s interests facilitated his administration bids to reach an agreement and preserve it.